Abstract

The predominant “story” about the Slovenian nationalism before the collapse of the SFRY is simple: Slovenian nationalism (negative perception) or “the Slovenian spring” (positive perception) “appeared” in the 1980s, it identified itself as “anti-Yugoslavism” and reached its climax in 1991 with the Slovenian independence. Yet, historical sources – both archival and publicistic – expose different stories: the relation between Slovenian nationalism and Yugoslavism is much more ambiguous and complicated. Why is the Slovenian Yugoslavism of the 1980s a relevant topic for international comparative historiography of the second Yugoslavia and its successor states? I would point out two reasons. First, I claim that Yugoslavism of any kind could not exist without Slovenianism, especially since the creation of the first Yugoslavia in 1918. The history of Slovenian Yugoslavism (or Slovenian nationalism in general) is not just relevant for “the Slovenian national historiography”, without “the Slovenian component” we cannot understand Yugoslavia or Yugoslavism in general, which could be understood only in historical context. Although almost all authors recognize the significance of the Slovenian-Serbian conflict for the Yugoslav collapse: they assign surprisingly little attention to Slovenian intellectual circles. They are almost always mentioned, but rarely properly analyzed. Secondly, most of historical analysis is preoccupied with the reasons for the collapse of the Yugoslavia. As H. Grandits and H. Sundhaussen have pointed out, if we research the history of a state that does not exist anymore, we unintentionally “search for” elements of the past, which explain why the state had failed. This is also the reason why Slovenian historians – those who consider the methodology of the academic historiography – are mainly focused on the “processes of independence” or the “processes of democratization”. Slovenian Yugoslavism is not in the spotlight of attention, furthermore, it is mostly seen as an insignificant side-effect of the official Yugoslav ideology of “brotherhood and unity”, not as something genuinely Slovenian.

Slovenian Yugoslavism as a topic of intellectual history: Why should we discuss it?

The predominant “story” about the Slovenian nationalism before the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is simple: Slovenian nationalism (negative perception) or “the Slovenian spring” (positive perception) “appeared” in the 1980s. It identified itself as “anti-Yugoslavism” and reached its climax in 1991 with the Slovenian independence. Yet, historical sources – both archival and publicistic – tell a different story: the relation between Slovenian nationalism and Yugoslavism is much more ambiguous and complicated.

The contribution does not represent complete results of the research. Rather, it can be seen as a “preliminary working paper” or a “proposal” for the beginning of a further discussion. The research of the topic is still work in progress. The materials the author collected so far could be classified in four categories: a) archive materials (mainly documents of the Central Committee of The League of Communists of Slovenia – CC LCS); b) Newspapers and popular Slovenian and Yugoslav press (Mladina, Teleks, Delo, Komunist, Danas, NIN); c) Specialised reviews for Intellectuals (Nova revija, Problemi, Naša sodobnost); d) Ego-documents (memoirs, letters, diaries). The author intends to carry out interviews with important actors of the Slovenian (and Yugoslav) intellectual scene of the 1980’s.

Why is the Slovenian Yugoslavism in the 1980s a relevant topic for the international comparative historiography of the second Yugoslavia and its successor states? I would like to
point out two reasons. First, I believe that Yugoslavism of any kind could not exist without Slovenianism, especially after the creation of the First Yugoslavia in 1918. The history of Slovenian Yugoslavism (or Slovenian nationalism in general) is not just relevant for “the Slovenian national historiography”: without “the Slovenian component” we cannot understand the political/social/cultural dynamics in Yugoslavia or Yugoslavism in general, which can only be understood in the historical context. Although almost all authors recognize the significance of the conflict between the Slovenia’s and Serbia’s political elites for the collapse of the Yugoslav state, but pay surprisingly scant attention to the Slovenian intellectual circles. They are almost always mentioned, but rarely properly analysed. Intellectuals are not just “poppy-growers in Pakistan”, who provide the “raw material” for the nationalist “drug” market, as Jasna Dragović Soso stated by quoting Hobsbawn. They are active producers, alchemists, who make “the stuff” in the laboratory by “fusing” parts of the past with present wishes and future glory in order to create pure gold. But most of all, intellectuals are involved in the creation of amnesia (Ernest Renan). They creatively remember ideologically convenient facts of the past, while overlooking what is discomfiting. Slovenian intellectuals cannot be criticized for the lack of creativity in the field of Yugoslavism. They were major contributors to the idea of Yugoslavism – from Jernej Kopitar to Edvard Kardelj. One of the main tasks of my research is to place the Slovenian intellectual “scene” into a broader Yugoslav context. The very fact of the great influence of Slovenian intellectuals at the end of the 1980s in Yugoslavia raises questions for further research: What were the reasons for this? How does this relate to the long-term development of the intellectual elites?

Secondly, most of the historical analysis is preoccupied with the reasons for the collapse of the Yugoslavia. As Hannes Grandits and Holm Sundhaussen have pointed out, if we research the history of a state that does not exist anymore, we unintentionally “search for” the elements of the past that explain why the state had failed. This is also the reason why Slovenian historians – those who consider the methodology of academic historiography – are mainly focused on the “processes of independence” or the “processes of democratisation”. Slovenian Yugoslavism is not in the centre of attention. Moreover, it is mostly seen as an insignificant side effect of the official Yugoslav ideology of “brotherhood and unity”, not as something genuinely Slovenian.

**Yugoslavism: a conceptual approach**

How can we define Yugoslavism? In the wider sense we could define it as a collection of ideas (ideologies), supporting the envisioned or existing community of Southern Slavs – in the cultural as well as political sense. It is not necessary that these ideas encompass the community of all Southern Slavs. However, Yugoslavism necessarily always involves more than simple connections between individual nations or national movements. It is always a

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form of a “new” quality, which is, at its onset, by all means more than merely a sum of individual nations/movements.

Yugoslavism is not a single phenomenon: there are many forms of Yugoslavism. It was never a homogenous ideology, but rather existed in several variations, sometimes presented as a single idea. By all means, in the 19th and 20th centuries Yugoslavism was a relatively successful ideology: already before 1918 it represented an important factor and assisted in the creation as well as maintenance of two Yugoslav states for many decades. How should we understand Yugoslavism without falling into the trap of unjustified generalisation or methodological nationalism?

Yugoslavism can be defined as a “working misunderstanding”. The history of Yugoslav ideas is a history of misunderstandings, but nevertheless the ideology “worked” somehow. The representatives of various national cultures and traditions understood Yugoslavism in different ways. Moreover, various variations of Yugoslavism with its own tradition and protagonists existed within the national cultures/traditions. The success of individual variations depended on the political context and social structure of the societies. Yugoslavism was not enforced from “without” – it was an "integral part" or an “internal orientation” of the individual national movements. We can also understand it as the “final frontier” of the compromise between the Yugoslav nations, as an attempt to establish the borders between the Yugoslav nations or an attempt of avoiding the borders. The main characteristics of the proposed approach include the following aspects:

(1) A long-term analysis of the phenomenon (circa 1800-2014): The research of longer periods allows for the understanding of those characteristics of Yugoslavisms that persist in certain environments for a considerable length of time, and also those features that "vanish" and then reappear in other social and political contexts. The long-term perspective should also be taken into account while we focus on the phenomenon in shorter periods of time.

(2) The importance of the context: The characteristics of Yugoslavisms keep changing or modifying as they are transferred from one generation to another or from one tradition/environment to another. Intellectuals constantly search for ideas in the national history in order to re-use them in the contemporary political context.

(3) Although the approach emphasises the continuities and significance of individual national cultures/traditions, it does not argue for the idea of “ideological permanence” of the Yugoslav nationalisms from the 19th century onwards. The proposed approach also has nothing to do with the popular media perceptions of the "ancient ethnic hatred" in Yugoslavia. As Holm Sundhaussen put it, ethnic hatred was not a reason for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but a “secondary effect” of these processes.

Of course, if the approach takes into account the various national traditions/environments/movements/cultures, then it presupposes that these exist. How can we

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define them? How to put them in the temporal context? Yugoslavism is being analysed here in the context of the development of European nationalisms, which are being seen as phenomena related to the modernisation processes. Although we take note of certain characteristics of the ethno-symbolic perspective (long duration, integration into the context of the pre-existing “collective cultural identities” and pre-modern traditions), we envision the approach in the context of the modernist paradigm. The proposed approach preserves significant scepticism with regard to the claims emphasising the direct connection between the pre-modern ethnicities and nationalisms or to the claims that in some cases nations manifested themselves before the nationalisms. So since when can Yugoslavism be followed? The concept of national thought, introduced in the theory of nationalism by the Dutch comparatist Joep Leeressen, can assist us in the attempt to answer this question. Yet, the explanation of the national thought is hard to specify. It involves the attitude towards the human society “as consisting predominantly of mutually delimited, irreplaceable nations, of which each has a self-evident right to existence and each is characteristically defined and unequivocally separated by its own identity and culture.”

If with the concept of national thought we can place the beginning of Yugoslavism roughly into the period when under the pressure of early modernisation in the Southern Slavic space the national thought started developing (a completely precise periodisation is, of course, impossible), the proposed approach has to face the classic problems involved in analysing nationalisms: is Yugoslavism a cultural or political category? Can Yugoslavism be defined by means of subjective or objective characteristics? In view of the fact that Yugoslavism was (also) embodied in two states, we should ask ourselves whether it should be seen merely as “civic” nationalism, or whether it can also represent “ethnic” nationalism? The matter is further complicated by the fact that Yugoslavism as a subject of a historical analysis has certain characteristics which make its placement into the theory of nationalisms, for example at the classification level, rather difficult. Yugoslavism can be a national ideology, supranational ideology, or sub-national ideology (which is emphasised by our approach). It can also be all three simultaneously. In order to evade the theoretical pitfalls which would fail to result in constructive answers, we propose to observe the perspective emphasised by the renowned Turkish explorer of nationalisms Umut Özkirimli. Özkirimli, basing his work on modernism and social constructivism, proposes that nationalism should be seen as a discourse: nationalism is a special way of seeing and interpreting the world, a reference framework that helps us to understand the structure of reality around us. When exploring Yugoslavism as a discourse we can make use of the historical discourse analysis approach, as defined by the German historian Achim Landwehr: historical discourse analysis stems from the constructed nature of the socio-cultural reality and studies the manners in which the forms of knowledge are shaped in the historical process. Discourses involve patterns of order, inseparable from the forms of power, in which the social construction of reality is organised.

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The historical perspective is important because discourses are based solely on their own historical nature.\textsuperscript{10}

Özkirimli’s definition of the four ways in which the nationalist discourse “operates” can help us to conceptualise Yugoslavism: a) the discourse of nationalism separates the world into “us” and “them”; b) the discourse of nationalism hegemonises; c) the discourse of nationalism naturalises itself; d) the discourse of nationalism operates “through” institutions.\textsuperscript{11}

**Hypothesis: detachment of Yugoslavism**

The line between Yugoslavism and Slovenianism was never completely clear. It only became clear once Slovenianism became separate from Yugoslavism, or vice versa – a matter of perspective. Therefore the question of how and when Slovenianism separated itself from Yugoslavism is completely justified. During the 1980s the process of detachment of Slovenianism from Yugoslavism took place in the Slovenian public. Yugoslavism did not just break away from Slovenianism abruptly. In our opinion this was a slow and completely unplanned process of “detachment” in the context of the specific circumstances in Slovenia and Yugoslavia, as well as in the context of changes in the international environment. If we define Yugoslavism as a working misunderstanding, then we should also address the question why we should discuss the “detachment” at all, if misunderstandings were, so to say, an integral part of Yugoslavism. In order to avoid misunderstandings: it was not unitarist Yugoslavism, Yugoslavism of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia or even Serbian Yugoslavism that detached itself from Slovenianism in the 1980s. Rather, it was Slovenian Yugoslavism as a part of the Slovenian national ideology that was discarded.

In the 1980s the production of articles, interviews, papers, essays, elaborates and programme texts dealing with the issue of the Slovenian national question or the problem of nationalism/nations was very prolific. Nevertheless, what is most surprising is the absence of Yugoslavia. In these texts Yugoslavia is only mentioned when absolutely necessary. As if the authors were ashamed of it. Slovenian Yugoslavism gradually “peeled away” like an old street poster, it “detaches” from Slovenianism precisely by means of absence. Rather than on Yugoslavia, Slovenian intellectuals focus on themselves. Their homeland is Central Europe, Europe, the world, the Western civilisation, “Republic of Lettres”, Christianity, and above all Slovenia.\textsuperscript{12}

What happened in the 1980s in comparison with the preceding periods? After Tito’s death – that is, in the time of economic crisis and “stabilisation”\textsuperscript{13} – the discussions about nations, nationalisms and roles of individual nations became different. If they were limited to Party forums and specialised publications for the intellectuals before, at this time the mass media

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{10} Landwehr, Achim (2008): Historische Diskursanalyse. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, pp. 96, 97.
\textsuperscript{11} Özkirimli (2005), pp. 32, 33.
\end{footnotesize}
started focusing on them with increasing frequency, especially the daily and weekly press. The media were supervised by the republican authorities, but the Yugoslav media space existed nevertheless. The daily and weekly newspapers in various corners of Yugoslavia regularly summed up and reprinted or translated the most resounding articles and comments from the other republics. In this way an all-Yugoslav discussion, which should (theoretically or according to the ideology) result in the strengthening of brotherhood and unity, was made “technically” feasible. However, during the 1980s this space for discussions became, more and more frequently, a place of open conflicts. The texts about the problematic nature of nationalism in Yugoslavia helped to construct a nationalistic perception of the social relations, although the intention was frequently quite the opposite. Yugoslavism also went through a crisis in the space where it truly existed: in the printed media.

In the historiography dealing with Yugoslavia or Slovenia in the 1980s, the term Yugoslavism is not frequently used. When he speaks about the attitude of the younger generations towards Yugoslavia, Božo Repe uses the term “Yugoslav conscience”.14 Expressions like “the Slovenian attitude towards the federation” are much more commonly used, which is completely justified, as the historians mostly studied the political, economic and cultural relations between the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and the federal centre.15 In the well-known overview of the Slovenian history Peter Vodopivec, when he writes about the 1980s, does not mention the term Yugoslavism.16 Nevertheless, Slovenian Yugoslavism is not the same as the Slovenian attitude towards the Yugoslav federation, nor the Slovenian attitude towards the other Yugoslav nations.

The late socialism context

Was the case of the Slovenian and Yugoslavian intellectuals special in comparison with other Eastern European countries? Well, yes and no. The question itself is misleading: it presupposes clear answers. If we compare at a glance the countries under the Soviet influence with Yugoslavia, then we must consider at least three similarities: the leading role of the Party, authoritarian tendencies, and Marxist ideology. Likewise, differences are equally important: the absence of the “big Soviet brother”, the federation (inter-republic and inter-national relations), a more liberal system, relatively open borders, and the specific system of “workers’ self-management”.

The researchers of the role of intellectuals in the Eastern European socialist societies emphasize the “intimate” relationship between the communist ideology and philosophy as well as the important role of intellectuals as “producers of knowledge” in a severely politicized society. In this context intellectuals were unavoidably associated with various practices and institutions of the social power. At this level interesting phenomena took place. If the “communist project in practice” required the intellectual apparatus in order to provide an apology

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15 Ibid., p. 22.
16 See: Vodopivec, Peter (2006): Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostojne države. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. stoletja do konca 20. stoletja. Ljubljana: Modrijan. For the period after 1945 Vodopivec uses the concept “Yugoslavism” only to describe the well-known debate between Pirjevec and Čosić in 1960/61, see page 359 of the listed work.
for the “historical necessity” of the communist vision of the society or the preservation of the theoretical and conceptual apparatus that provided concrete answers to the challenges presented by the life in socialism, then it is interesting that the dissidents and anti-communist activists developed similar philosophical frameworks in order to prove that the communist project was “historically impossible”. The clash between the regime and discursive opposition was structured as a constant philosophical exchange between the rival visions of world, truth, and society. The debates took place in a space defined by three actors: institutions for the production of knowledge, institutions of power, and intellectuals as intermediaries between knowledge and power. To put it simply: if the “true” intellectuals in the socialist societies were very powerful, then their counterparts – the dissident intellectuals – were potentially powerful as well.

We can identify another common feature on the level of the discourses. As Michal Ko-peček states, the discourse of human rights gave the critics of the socialist regimes in Eastern Central Europe a unifying language. Furthermore, dissidents in various socialist countries have developed a peculiar fusion of a human rights discourse and nationalism. The emancipatory power of the human rights discourse could not be separated from the national and historical frameworks. Some of the intellectuals understood that nationality (not citizenship) ensured solidarity among the population in general. They have “invented” the language of civic or critical patriotism, which usually included profound self-criticism, self-reflective citizenry, and national unity against “the regime”. The critical intellectuals in Slovenia (and Yugoslavia) have followed this path as well, although the regime in Yugoslavia gave much more latitude to the expression of critical thought.

The discussion about Yugoslavism and Slovenianism in the 1980s took place in a similar context. The clash and exchange between the regime and the discursive opposition also took place in the field of the Slovenian nationalism or nationalist discourse. The LCS had important institutions for the production of knowledge at its disposal, which maintained the “true” explanation of the Slovenian national question. In the 1980s the competing visions of the Slovenian nationalism kept getting increasingly louder. Let us take, for example, the discussion about nationalism and relations between the nations at the session of the CC LCS on 11 November 1985. Already in the first sentence of his introductory speech Ciril Ribičič stated that the League of Communists was responsible for the assertion of the interests of the Slovenian nation, which, however, should not be confused with “nationalist egoism”. Any ambiguity, indecisiveness and inefficiency with regard to this represent an invitation for the differently oriented forces to establish themselves as the defenders of the Slovenian national interests. Although Ribičič, in his speech, underlined the separatist as well as unitarist versions of nationalism in Yugoslavia, which was a frequent practice of the Yugoslav com-

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19 Ibid., p. 576.
20 Ibid., p. 584.
21 Lusa, Stefano (2012): Razkroj oblasti, Slovenski komunisti in demokratizacija države. Ljubljana: Modrijan, p. 102
munists, he mostly focused on the unitarist danger. He especially attacked those who openly argued for the revision of the constitutional relations in Yugoslavia in the context of the conflict between the “defenders of the constitution” and “unitarists” in the federal leadership of the state.  

Ribičič’s speech includes all of the main characteristics of the Slovenian “regime intellectual” discourse about the problem of nationalism: strict distinction between negative nationalism (them) and positive pursuit of the interests of the Slovenian nation (us), supporting the arguments by quoting various authorities (Kardelj, League of Communists of Yugoslavia congress resolutions), and emphasising that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had a clear and singular attitude to the management of the relations between the nations, which was far from the truth.

**Slovenian Yugoslavism**

Already in the period between 1945 and 1991, Slovenian nationalism was an integral part of the Slovenian society. It was embodied in the Slovenian cultural and political institutions and harmonized with (federal) Yugoslavism and the Yugoslav socialist system. Yugoslavism, the way the Slovenian elite understood it, did not oppose Slovenianism – it complemented it. Yugoslav unitarism was practically non-existent in Slovenia after 1945. Slovenian Yugoslavism was presupposing the territorially defined nations. This view could be subscribed to because Slovenia was the most “nationally homogeneous” republic in the federation. Because words were important in the predominately ideological society, one had to choose the right discourse. Communist intellectuals often disguised nationalist speech into the Marxist discourse supported by quotes from Josip Broz Tito’s or Edvard Kardelj’s texts. In the 1930s Kardelj developed an original theory about the future of small nations. Nations would eventually merge into a “common human society”, but this would not happen by force. On the contrary, the path to a society without nations inevitably leads through “the sovereignty of every nation”. The process of socialist development will gradually fill the “national forms” with new “common human contents.” With this intellectual paradox Kardelj secured the future of the Slovenian nation in the envisioned communist nation-less “world society”.  

Edvard Kardelj – the main architect of the Yugoslav state system – revised his attitude towards the position of Slovenia in Yugoslavia in the foreword of the second edition of the *Development of the Slovenian National Question* (1957). The Slovenian national question is, he argued, in principle solved in the framework of the new Yugoslavia. “After a long period of subordination Slovenians have gained their own state, a socialist people’s republic in the framework of the Yugoslav federation.” The essence of “Yugoslavism today” is the socialist interest and socialist consciousness. Kardelj identified three factors which could “act in the direction of the acute opening of the national question”. (1) The remains of the classic bourgeois nationalism, “cloaking” or covering up the various anti-socialist tendencies. These tendencies could also appear as an expression of the asymmetrical economic development of Yugoslavia. And finally, they could appear as a form of a negative reaction to the big-state bureaucratic centralism. (2) The bureaucratic centralism, based on the monopoly of the state

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25 Ibid., p. 42.
property. These tendencies could be even more dangerous, as they could undermine the achievements of the revolution. The complete concentration of power in the hands of the central state apparatus could lead to bureaucratic despotism. Naturally, this development would result in resistance, which would be historically necessary and progressive, but it would stimulate bourgeois nationalisms. Furthermore, bureaucratic centralism could be the basis for the revival of an old chauvinist “integral Yugoslavism” and “great-Serbian nationalism”. “Its apparent ‘Yugoslav’ form, which the phenomenon usually assumes, does not change the matter.”

(3) Differences in the economic development of the different parts of Yugoslavia. How to solve the problem? First of all, Kardelj stated, we should not turn a blind eye to the problem. Due to dissimilar historical development, different regions of Yugoslavia were at various stages of economic development. It would be wrong to impede the progress of the developed parts of Yugoslavia until the undeveloped parts “caught up” with them. Likewise it would be even more harmful to “preserve” the differences in the development of the particular parts of Yugoslavia, resulting in privileges for the developed parts of the country.

Slovenian Yugoslavism openly confronted the Serbian version of the Yugoslav ideology for the first time in the early sixties. The Ćošić-Pirjevec debate (1961/62) is often cited as the first public discussion of the nature of the national problem in post-war Yugoslavia. According to Nick Miller, the debate was “a surrogate for interparty debate over the Yugoslav future.” It certainly was: both intellectuals enjoyed the support of the Slovenian (Dušan Pirjevec) and Serbian (Dobrica Ćosić) Party leaders. We could also place the debate in the context of the discussion about the new Yugoslav constitution. Do we want more “federal” or more “integral” Yugoslavia? From the cultural stance, the “centralists” supported the idea of the “unified Yugoslav socialist culture”, while the “federalists” argued for the preservation of the national cultures. However, Ćosić and Pirjevec were not just the “media” for the local Party leaders. They very both independent intellectuals, former Partisans, who entered the debate in an open and honest fashion. They openly expressed what they actually thought.

Yugoslavism was, for Ćosić at the time, a free process by which the nations and people grow together and unify socialistically. Yugoslavism was supposed to be a social construct that would coexist with the national identities as cultural identities, which would in the future be less important than the higher identification with the Yugoslav socialist society. Pirjevec agreed up to a point, but he saw nationality as an integral part of any human society. He advocated Kardelj’s interpretation of the nation in socialism and developed it further. Although nations result from capitalist development, they are not a bourgeois category. A true socialist and democratic society recognises the nation “in all its totality” and “in its natural dimensions”. It is not just about the protection of certain particularities (cultural autonomy) or about territorial autonomy, but rather about the acknowledgment and affirmation of “the specific organism – the nation”. Pirjevec agreed with Ćosić about the “withering away”

26 Ibid., p. 47.
27 Ibid., p. 50.
of the state, but stressed that this process would eventually emphasise the category of nations.31

Slovenian intellectuals in the 1980 – who were they?

Can the Slovenian intellectuals who focused on the issues of nationalism be separated into “groups” or categories? In our opinion the well-founded division of intellectuals into categories would be beneficial, especially due to methodological reasons: categories would allow for the easier placement of the intellectuals into a wider context. Of course, these categories would not be absolute: once the historical analysis is carried out, we could – should the sources support that decision – also deconstruct them. In our opinion we could, at least at the current level of research, divide the Slovenian intellectuals in the 1980s who dealt with the issues of Yugoslavism and Slovenianism into three categories: the “regime” intellectuals, the “dissidents” and the left-liberal and leftist intellectuals. The borders between the categories cannot be specified, as certain intellectuals cannot be included in any of the three categories we have mentioned and which should be briefly described here.

The Slovenian regime intellectuals could present themselves as “genuine” intellectual leaders of the Slovenian nation. They argued that if they failed to take care of the Slovenian language and culture, someone else would: the bourgeois right, emigration, Catholic Church. This was hardly possible in the other Yugoslav republics. When the Croatian cultural establishment took a similar stand towards the Croatian national question in the late 1960s they caused a powerful reaction in the federal centre.32 Emphasising the Serbian identity was also problematic, especially when the new (con)federal constitution was adopted in 1974.33 Some Slovenian regime intellectuals were even more nationalist and anti-Yugoslav as the opposition intellectuals. For example, the first Slovenian national program in the 1980s was not written by the opposition, but by the dogmatic communist France Klopčič. In 1984 Klopčič, a Slovenian historian and revolutionary who spent eight years in a Siberian gulag in the 1940, proposed to the CC LCS a “Slovenian national program during the building of socialism.” The program was discussed at closed Party forums, but it was never adopted. Klopčič argued that Slovenian communists “should not exclude the possibility of a confederation in advance the confederation and broaden autonomy of the republics.”34

Janko Pleterski, a distinguished historian and communist, tried to reconstruct Kardelj’s vision of the national question in Yugoslavia on the basis of historical sources and Marxism. He was one of the rare Slovenian intellectuals who did not just argue for the Slovenian viewpoints, but tried to promote Yugoslavism as a “consciousness” important for all Yugoslav people. According to his perspective, Yugoslavism rested on the three “pillars”: nations – revolution – Yugoslavia. If any of the ideological bases would “crumble”, the Yugoslav state would collapse. Pleterski argued for a kind of a Yugoslav socialist patriotism. Although

not visible at the first glance, the novelty of Pleterski’s vision of Yugoslavism lays in emphasising the importance of nations as important subjects.35

The word “dissident” with the reference to Yugoslav intellectuals in the 1980s should be used with caution, especially if we compare the position of Yugoslav dissidents with the dissidents in other socialist countries.36 “Dissident” intellectuals in Slovenia could publish articles, they had public jobs, and some of them were even members of the LCS. Yet, they had a “dissident” identity and they were seen as such by the authorities. In the 1980s the most influential group of “dissident” intellectuals was the circle of the “Nova revija” magazine (since 1982). The contributors to this magazine were fierce critics of the established political system and supporters of “slovenstvo” (Slovenianism), although it seemed that the oppositional attitude had some advantage over Slovenian nationalism. They were promoting the values of the Western democracy, emphasising the oppressive character of the Yugoslav communism and supporting Kundera’s perception of Central Europe. The “Nova revija” magazine published Kundera’s famous text just a couple months after it was originally published in “The New York Review of Books” in 1984.37

How nationalist was the Nova revija circle? It would be wrong to declare these intellectuals as a group of rightist, exclusive nationalists, traditionalists, or even clericalists (as Branka Magaš argued),38 but we could certainly label them as nationalists. They practiced a very peculiar form of intellectual-liberal nationalism. They argued for openness, cosmopolitanism, they were against exclusive nationalism, violence, repression and clericalism. Slovenian nationalism was often criticised. However, their vision of the nation was not particularly open. Most of the Nova revija intellectuals understood the nation in the terms of perennialism or primordialism. The Haideggerian philosopher Tine Hribar defined the concept of nation as follows: “People (ljudstvo) are the multitude of nationally undefined individuals, nat-ion39 is a group of people of the same origin, people as a nat-ion (narod) form an ethnicity. A state is a sovereign political power, while a nation (nacija) is a cross-section of a state and nat-ion (narod).”40 This thesis was based on Dušan Pirjevec’s philosophical discussion entitled “Vprašanje naroda” (Question of the Nation), published in the “Problemi” magazine in 1970. Even though Pirjevec did not distinguish between the “narod” (primordial nat-ion) and “nacija” (nation), he nevertheless identified two levels on which nations manifest themselves: as “a synthesis of ethnic, native and ‘nat-ional’, in short, as a language-cultural community” and as “an organised community, power, rationalisation and management”.41 Ivan Urbančič, another Haideggerian philosopher, developed Pirjevec’s ideas further. Despite similar argu-

39 The term nat-ion (nu-rod) was invented by Dušan Pirjevec. The word denotes the primordial, ethnic dimension of modern nation. According to Pirjevec, word nation originates from Latin word natus (being born). Nat-ion “comes from birth”, nat-ion is “something that man accepts by birth”. See: Pirjevec, Dušan (1978): Vprašanje o poeziji, Vprašanje naroda. Maribor: Založba Obzorja, p. 95.
mentation as Pirjevec, Urbančič’s interpretation of the nation gives a different impression. For Pirjevec the “openness” between the two “modes” of the nation and “primordial nation” is something positive: “The more reliable the separation between the nation and primordial nation, the more reliable the destiny of language and culture, which will no longer be merely the traditional national language and culture”. Urbančič’s discourse, however, is different, openly nationalistic, emphasising the nation as a system of power whose identity stems from the original, primordial nation, and “culminates in the establishment of its own state”.3

Yugoslavia as a community of peoples/nations was not problematic for the Nova revija circle, as long as Slovenia could develop its sovereignty, but the Yugoslav system was. They had close contacts with the dissident intellectuals in Yugoslavia, but were they practicing alternative Yugoslavism? It seems they were not cultivating ties with others through Yugoslavism. They were establishing connections with other “national subjects” directly, as the representatives of the “Slovenian national subject”. One “national subject” had considerable priority: the Serbs. Yugoslavia as a substantial category gradually faded away. Instead, the Slovenian-Serbian relations were becoming increasingly important. The Nova revija intellectuals were cultivating cordial relations with Dobrica Ćosić and his Serbian nationalist supporters.4 One of the most original Nova revija intellectuals, Taras Kermavner, was impressed with Ćosić and his charisma. “I follow with my tense eyes the lively Dobrica, who is thoughtful, worried, enthusiastic and uncompromising,” wrote Kermavner in his journal: “His energy never betrays him. […] He clearly paints our troubles, evils, but in the framework of the democratic nationally conscious intelligentsia. […] Dobrica carries out his mission, he devotes his life to his mission. Isn’t that a good thing? Should I be bothered by his immense loyalty to the Serbian nation? Isn’t loyalty in itself something good? Should I be disappointed by the fact he does not even know Slovenians and their problems? Are Slovenian problems not important enough for him? Am I not here for this reason, to connect Dobrica with Slovenianism?”5

We have the Slovenian State Security Service to thank for keeping the records about the famous meeting between the Serbian intellectuals (Dobrica Ćosić, Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić) and the Nova revija magazine circles in the “Mrak” tavern in Ljubljana on 15 November 1985. Here the Slovenian and Serbian intellectuals supposedly “parted their ways”, which is certainly true as far as the interpretation of Yugoslavism is concerned, but not in terms of the common opposition platform: opposing the “Bolshevist” regime in Yugoslavia. The discourse of the “recorded” discussion in “Mrak” is particularly interesting: the participants of “the Symposium” have discussed the issues of nationalism, Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia’s future in a way as if they were elected representatives of Slovenian and Serbian nation. By doing so, they – between the lines - presented themselves as “the true” intellectual leaders of their respective nations. Slovenians have repeatedly presented their idea that “we should all make a step towards Europe.” Taras Kermavner expressed an opinion that Slove-

42 Ibid.
nians “had to leave Europe in order to survive.” If they stayed in Europe, they would have become Germans: “It’s a tragic situation, resulting in our feelings of guilt. From the perspective of culture and civilisation, we are Central Europeans.” Urbančič argued that Slovenians could never constitute themselves as a subject, so they have always searched for possibilities to “stick” to something, not just to Yugoslavism. On the other hand, Ćosić’s stated that the Serbian nation felt betrayed: “Serbian politicians have served the Yugoslav unity, which was defined by the Comintern model of Yugoslavia. We have overlooked how divided we are, we are exploited, we are inferior, we’ve overlooked the fact that they have imposed borders on us.” He tried to explain to the Slovenian hosts how important Kosovo was for the Serbian nation. Slovenian intellectuals were not impressed by his argumentation; instead they argued that Kosovo “balkanised” Serbia. However, certain common points were adopted: the Marxist ideology was blamed for the contemporary national conditions in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 presupposed class identity. Ethnic and national features represented the primordial need of the people to associate. Class identity could not be the basis for the Yugoslav society.46

The ties with the Serbian nationalist intellectuals grew colder after 1985/86 due to conceptual differences and politics, but the Nova revija circle remained impressed with Serbian nationalist intellectuals. In the Contributions for the Slovenian National Programme (1987) the Serbs are treated in a positive manner, as a democratic and “heroic” nation. The controversial Memorandum of the SANU (1986) was interpreted as a “positive act and a contribution to the solution of the crisis”.47 Some contributors claimed that Macedonians, Montenegrins and the “Bosnian-Herzegovinian nation” did not have “enough strength” to be sovereign nations.48 The denial of the “true” nationality for Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was an important feature of the Serbian nationalism of the Ćosić’s circle.

The leftist and left-liberal intellectuals were primarily occupied with human rights, democracy, gay/lesbian rights, punk subculture etc.49 Yet they could not avoid the debates about nationalism. Nevertheless, some of them were interested in Slovenian nationalism. Their foothold was the “Mladina” weekly newspaper, the official publication of the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia. Although most of them were members of the LCS, in the second half of the 1980s they developed an oppositional attitude towards the political establishment, especially towards the Yugoslav Army. “Mladina” practiced insightful investigative reporting and bold commenting of the political situation.50 Like the nationalist-dissident intellectuals, they were open towards the Yugoslav space. The Mladina circle was an important part of the Yugoslav cultural/intellectual alternative scene (alternative media and festivals, punk/hardcore scene, alternative clubs). Politically they supported the autonomy of Slovenia, and they were ridiculing the official parole “brotherhood and unity”. Yugoslavism was not criticised from the position of Slovenian nationalism (they made fun of that as

46 Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, collection 1589/IV, technical unit 2637/37. I hereby thank Dr. Aleš Gabrič for the materials.
well). They tried to hold an alternative “a-nationalist” position. By doing so, they severely underestimated the power of nationalisms. However, their media activity had an unpredictable nationalist impact. The borders between democratisation and Slovenian exclusivism were not clear in the late-socialist Slovenian society, and the Mladina intellectuals helped complicate the matter. The relations with the dissident-nationalist intellectuals were ambivalent. They were supporting each other from a distance, as allies against official politics. When Milošević gained power in Serbia, they have also become allies against the Serbian nationalism. It is interesting that the non-nationalist Mladina intellectuals sparked the nationalist fever of “the Slovenian spring” in 1988. During the so-called JBTZ Trial many journalists and one army officer were put on trial after they had obtained a secret Yugoslav Army document, which caused a resistance of the civil society and mass demonstrations.

The Mladina intellectuals had a critical attitude towards Slovenianism. Between 1981 and 1985 the philosopher Slavoj Žižek, one of the most renowned Mladina commentators, worked on the project “Role of the Unconscious Phantasms in the Process of Identity Making of Slovenians’’ at the Institute for Sociology, University of Ljubljana. Žižek was mostly using the topic of Slovenians as a material for a “psychoanalytical approach in social sciences”. His book “Language, Ideology, Slovenians” (1987) did not focus on the past and present position of the Slovenian nation. Žižek analysed the three prevailing forms of social ties in Slovenia: provincialism, “Stalinist socialism”, and late bourgeois society. But most of all, he used Slovenians in order to develop his version of a psychoanalytic theory of ideology. His work could be interpreted as a critique of Slovenian nationalism (provincialism) and Yugoslav self-management system (“Stalinist socialism”). He was not interested either in the position of Slovenia in Yugoslavia or in the Yugoslav ideology. In fact, the words “Yugoslavia” or “Yugoslav” do not even appear in the book.

The problems of typology

The aforementioned typology of Slovenian intellectuals was discussed at the Seminar of the Imre Kertész Kolleg Jena on 8 December 2014, where the author presented the paper on Yu-

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52 JBTZ is an abbreviation, composed of the initials of the arrested journalists and officers (Janša, Zavrl, Borštner, Tasič). Other names: the Trial against the Four (Proces proti četverici), Ljubljana trial (Ljubljanski proces).
53 The Mladina journalists obtained the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists at which the top military representatives had criticised Slovenia, and reported on it extensively. Yugoslav army command demanded that the Slovene leadership investigate how Mladina had managed to obtain on the confidential material and punish those responsible. The Slovene and military authorities were aware that the arrests would trigger public protests, but the protest movement that followed far surpassed their expectations. The arrests and the anticipated trial before a military court created the impression that the military leadership was beginning to carry out its threats and lock up Slovene opponents, bypassing the Slovene authorities. At the beginning of June 1988, in Ljubljana, a Committee for the Protection of Human Rights was set up, and this organised a number of protests. With the slogan “Freedom, Democracy, Legal Protection”, it mobilised mass participation from the Slovene population. See: Vodopivec (2006), p. 487, 488; Repe (2001), p. 38.
goslavism and Slovenian intellectuals in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{55} The seminar participants identified certain weaknesses of the typology at the level of consistency. The terms “regime intellectuals” and “dissidents” denote the relation to the state power, while the terms “leftist” and “left-liberal” denote political convictions. They have stressed the importance of international contextualization and comparative and/or transnational perspective. The absence of economy in Yugoslavia as a pressing problem for the Slovenian intellectuals in the 1980s was also criticised.

A constructive debate at the seminar revealed some interesting perspectives: these categories could be, to some extent, identified with the different generations of Slovenian intellectuals. The category of the regime intellectuals corresponds (more or less) to the older-generation intellectuals, the former Partisans active in the LCS and holding political functions. The category of the “dissidents” could be, to a certain degree, identified with the “middle” generation, born during the Second World War or shortly afterwards/before. This generation could hardly access prominent social/political positions due to the fact that the “Partisan generation”, occupying the important functions in Slovenia, was relatively young and still “held on” to power. The category of the leftist and left-liberal intellectuals was less homogeneous from a generational perspective, yet most of them were born in the late 1950s and 1960s. In the 1980s they had an important social framework at their disposal: they were the leading element of the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia, which evolved by the mid-1980s as “an umbrella” for the “new social movements”.\textsuperscript{56} Another important aspect, which was not addressed at the seminar, is the gender perspective. Feminist and lesbian movements represented an important part of the Slovenian civil society scene in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{57} However, the intellectuals who discussed the issue of Yugoslavism/Slovenianism were predominately men (with some important exceptions, e.g. Spomenka Hribar).

The research of the relation of Slovenian intellectuals to Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism should indeed take into account various forms of “transnational moments”. I would like to emphasise the following contexts:

The Context of Central Europe: Slovenian dissident intellectuals were establishing connections with the eastern dissidents through the notion of Central Europe. The process of the detachment of Yugoslavism from Slovenianism in the 1980s was in close relation to the new sensibility for the Habsburg legacy. The nostalgia for the lost world of Central Europe before the onset of communism was not a political program, but an ideological link to the West. “Mitteleuropa” was seen as a part of the West, as emphasised by Kundera himself, pushed to the east by the misfortune of the Yalta division of Europe. The feel for Central Europe was somewhat contradictory: a lot of effort was invested to present Slovenia as a special case (as almost the “West”). On the other hand, accepting the perception of Central Europe under Soviet “state socialism” framed Yugoslavia in the same category as the Warsaw Pact countries. “Dissidents” gladly accepted the dichotomy Central Europe – the Balkans, but it re-

mains unclear whether Central Europe has ever represented “anti-Yugoslavia” or has it still been in accordance with Slovenian Yugoslavism.

The context of liberal democratic Europe: Yugoslav intellectuals could travel and had access to the Western press/literature. The West was so close they could “smell it”, but in the background of the “self-management democracy” lurked the phantom of an authoritarian Party-state. The democratic Western press was seen as an important mirror of the Yugoslav reality.

The context of Yugoslavia as a common intellectual space: although already analysed, the Yugoslav context needs further attention. Slovenian intellectuals had little understanding of the Serbian dilemmas (Serbs as the most numerous, but also the most “dispersed” nation in Yugoslavia). On the other hand, Serbian intellectuals had little understanding of the Slovenian particularities (Slovenian language). They were both aware they had different concepts of Yugoslavism, but they both acted as if no significant differences existed. Furthermore, the relationship between Slovenian and Croatian intellectuals remains almost completely unresearched, not to mention the relation with the intellectuals from the other Yugoslav republics.

Conclusion

The “opposition” and “regime” intellectuals had a similar attitude to Yugoslavism: they both argued for Slovenian statehood and sovereignty; they both considered Slovenia as a state of (and for) the Slovenian nation, although in the union with other Yugoslav nations. The Yugoslav framework was not problematic unless the Slovenian interests were threatened. However, these intellectuals had different attitudes towards the Yugoslav socialist system and “Slovenian national interests”. The Regime intellectuals regarded the Slovenian Partisan movement (1941-1945) as an emancipatory movement, “ensuring” the Slovenian sovereignty by revolutionary action – Slovenia was already a sovereign, although not independent state. Meanwhile the intellectual opposition argued that Slovenia was not yet a sovereign country. In their view, the main obstacle for the Slovenian sovereignty was not the Yugoslav framework, but the “Leninist” one-party system, which suffocated the Yugoslav nations and nationalities. The third category of intellectuals (leftist and left-liberal) rejected the nationalist discourse. They opted for the values of civil society, pluralism, and alternative lifestyles. According to them the Yugoslav framework was not disputable, but it was not necessary or obligatory either. They supported the autonomy of Slovenia, but in the context of pluralism and open society.

Although Slovenian intellectuals, in the 1980s occupied with questions of nation and nationalism, subscribed to various concepts and starting points, we could identify certain common features:

a) Slovenians as the subject of analysis: Both nationalist and anti-nationalist intellectuals showed huge interest in researching the “Slovenian phenomenon”. What does it mean to be Slovenian? Who are Slovenians, why are Slovenians the way they are? While the nationalist intellectuals tried to affirm Slovenianism, anti-nationalist intellectuals criticised the “dark
side” of Slovenian nationalism. Some of them even tried to do both. Sophisticated theoretical tools and intellectual authorities were used in order to prove various points (Marx, Althusser, Freud, Lacan, Heidegger).

b) Anti-historical discourse and interpretation of history: History was treated as a “pool” of the past from which intellectuals could grab whatever they liked and interpret it with a refined theoretical apparatus. History was often equated with the history of literature. Heroes from the novels are presented as “real” or “archetypical” persons. Slovenian historiography was not considered. Historians remained on the fringes of these discussions. They often researched the “taboo topics”, but they did not have the status of those who interpreted the past. Historians were just supposed to expose historical facts and leave the interpretation to philosophers, writers, poets etc.

c) Yugoslavism was not addressed as a relevant topic. Yugoslavia was seen simply as a political/state framework, which should be dealt with critically.

d) Slovenian intellectuals in the 1980’s have used the civil society/human rights discourse (political language).

e) They were open towards the Yugoslav intellectual scene.

How can we place the examples of the detachment of Yugoslavism from Slovenianism in the context of nationalism as a discourse? The least we can determine on the basis of our discussion is the conclusion that in the 1980s changes took place in the field of the nationalist discourse in the Slovenian media space and intellectual public. In its essence the detachment of Yugoslavism from Slovenianism is a process of the changing of the nationalist discourse. There was nothing obligatory about this process: it took place in the context of deeper social and political changes, which had not been “programmed” in advance. If the separation of the world to “us” and “them” was one of the main characteristics of the nationalist discourse, then we can definitely claim that the Slovenian Yugoslavism in the Second Yugoslavia always presupposed “us” (Slovenians) and “them” (other nations in Yugoslavia), even if the common issues – the state, specific system, ideology, “Party”, sports, culture, etc. – were at the forefront. As Yugoslavism peeled away, the definition of “us” and “them” in the Slovenian nationalist discourse changed as well.
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